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REVISING CIVIL RULE 56: JUDGE MARK R. KRAVITZ AND THE 
RULES ENABLING ACT 
by 
Edward H. Cooper* 
This contribution uses the history of amending Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56, “Summary Judgment,” to pay tribute to Mark R. Kravitz 
and to the Rules Enabling Act process itself. The three central examples 
involve discretion to deny summary judgment despite the lack of a 
genuine dispute as to any material fact, the choice whether to prescribe a 
detailed “point–counterpoint” procedure for presenting and opposing the 
motion, and the effect of failure to respond to a motion in one of the 
modes prescribed by the rule. These topics are intrinsically important. The 
ways in which the Civil Rules Advisory Committee and the Standing 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure grappled with these topics 
provide strong reassurances about the capacities of the Enabling Act 
process to work through difficult problems both by work internal to the 
committees and by considering, understanding, and adopting the wise 
advice offered by public comments and testimony at the public hearings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay draws from the process of revising the summary-judgment 
rule, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to praise Judge 
Mark R. Kravitz’s work as Chair of the United States Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This high 
praise is mingled with admiration for the Rules Enabling Act framework 
that enables the Committee’s work. The purpose to pay tribute is para-
mount—Rule 56 features prominently, but in a supporting role. The his-
tory includes some valuable lessons about Rule 56 as it took effect on De-
cember 1, 2010, but this is not a Rule 56 article. 
Four main Parts follow an initial offering of direct praise for Judge 
Kravitz. These Parts cannot be fully separated. The first Part briefly de-
scribes the origins of the Rule 56 work. The next Part explores three ma-
jor elements and one minor element that changed in important ways as 
the project progressed—the word of command (once again “shall,” no 
longer “should”); the directions for moving and responding (“point–
counterpoint” was abandoned); the authority to consider a fact undis-
puted for failure to respond without examining the proponent’s show-
ing; and the opportunity to accept a fact “for purposes of the motion on-
ly.” Each of these changes was shaped in important ways by comments 
and testimony from sources outside the Committee. The third Part pro-
vides some further illustrations of changes in the early proposals, often 
generated within the Committee process. The final Part draws from the 
first Parts to underscore the strengths of the procedures that contribute 
to the success of the Rules Enabling Act. 
JUDGE KRAVITZ 
For direct praise, let me quote part of a letter I wrote for a happier 
purpose in 2010, while Mark Kravitz was Chair of the Civil Rules Commit-
tee and before he left the Committee to become Chair of the Standing 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure: 
I have worked closely with Mark since he took over as Civil Rules 
Committee Chair. The standard of comparison is high. The chairs I 
have worked with over the years have been in the forefront of the 
federal judiciary: Sam Pointer, Patrick Higginbotham, Paul Nie-
meyer, David Levi, and Lee Rosenthal. Working with each was of 
course different in many ways, one from another. But there has 
been a much more important continuity. I have learned enormous-
ly from each, and greatly enjoyed the experience. 
Working with Mark has equaled the joys of working with each of his 
predecessors. It is presumptuous to attempt even a brief catalogue 
of his accomplishments, but I presume to make the attempt. 
Perhaps the most important task of the chair is to set the Commit-
tee agenda. There are many more possibilities for adjusting the Civ-
il Rules than the Enabling Act process can accommodate, or than 
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the courts and profession could endure. Guiding the Committee in 
the decisions among competing possibilities requires fine judg-
ment. Some topics are essentially inescapable—the current and 
continuing perturbation about the fate of “notice pleading” is a fine 
example. Others may be obviously important, but not obviously 
manageable. Still others are interesting, and perhaps useful, but not 
urgent or even not worth the bother. Timing also is important. The 
common-law process works in interpreting the rules, and often will 
get to right results if it is just left alone for a while. In my estimate, 
Mark has displayed flawless judgment in these matters. 
Actual Committee work on rules proposals shows the same 
strengths. It takes at least three years, and often more, to make a 
rule. But Mark has already shepherded to completion the Time 
Computation Project (he chaired the Standing Committee sub-
committee that coordinated the work of all the advisory commit-
tees), which has taken effect, as well as amendments that will take 
effect this December 1 absent a disapproving Act of Congress: a 
complete rewriting of the summary-judgment rule and important 
changes in disclosure and discovery with respect to expert trial wit-
nesses. Ongoing work will reflect the fruits of an ambitious two-day 
conference the Committee sponsored last month at Duke Law 
School.1 
The pace of committee work virtually assures that projects begun 
with the guidance of one chair carry on with the guidance of a successor. 
So it was with Mark’s time as chair. The profusion of ideas generated at 
the Duke Conference2 caused Mark to appoint a subcommittee to deter-
mine whether the Civil Rules might be amended in response.3 The work 
continued under the guidance of Judge John G. Koeltl as Subcommittee 
Chair and Judge David G. Campbell as Committee Chair. The package of 
proposals that has emerged from that work was published for comment 
in August 2013, and generated an outpouring of comments and testimo-
ny from bench, bar, and the academy. This public review process is inval-
uable, even—and perhaps particularly—when, as here, the published 
proposals provoke many opposing positions, forcefully and cogently ex-
pressed. All of this advice was considered at the Committee meeting held 
in conjunction with this Tribute. 
The Rule 56 experience provides another illustration of passing the 
torch from one committee chair to another. The work began while Judge 
Lee H. Rosenthal chaired the Civil Rules Committee. When she moved to 
chair the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Mark 
Kravitz became Chair of the Civil Rules Committee and carried the work 
 
1 Letter from Edward H. Cooper (on file with author). 
2 The 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation was held at Duke Law School on May 
10–11, 2010. 
3 For more information on the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, appointments to 
the committee, and records of committee action, see Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, Records and Archives of the Rules Committee, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/archives.aspx. 
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to its conclusion. The initial welter of ideas and drafts, founded in large 
part on existing practices that had grown up around (or despite) the text 
of Rule 56, was continually refined. Some changes were made before a 
proposal was published for public comment. Additional changes were 
made in light of the written comments and testimony at three hearings. 
Mark Kravitz provided steady guidance, clear thinking, and creative ideas 
throughout. The ultimate product is the work of the committees, but his 
contributions as Chair and as member led the committees to a better 
product than could have been achieved without him. 
The work of the Advisory Committee was advanced by the Rule 56 
Subcommittee chaired by Judge Michael M. Baylson. This and other sub-
committees have done much of the hard initial work in framing the is-
sues and carefully working through draft rule proposals. The Advisory 
Committee, however, views subcommittee proposals as a starting point 
for collective work, in which all members, whether or not serving on the 
subcommittee, participate equally. So it was with Rule 56. 
Work as a reporter brings the great professional advantage of work-
ing with, and learning from, the committees and, most especially, the 
chairs. It also brings great personal satisfaction in working with the won-
derful people who have served as chair. Mark Kravitz was a most wonder-
ful person. 
I. THE BEGINNINGS 
The Supreme Court explored summary judgment extensively in 
three 1986 opinions that are commonly referred to as the “trilogy.”4 The 
rules committees reacted promptly, recommending adoption of a thor-
oughly revised Rule 56.5 The revised rule sought to express the standards 
and moving burdens announced by the Court, and also provided a com-
plete overhaul of the procedures for invoking and resisting summary 
judgment. The proposal was rejected by the Judicial Conference in 1992. 
Judicial Conference proceedings are confidential. Speculation, however, 
cannot be suppressed. A common speculation was that rejection was sup-
ported by conflicting views drawn from the common premise that the 
proposal accurately reflected what the Court had done. One view was 
that the rule “was working well in its present form and that judges had 
 
4  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986). 
5 Memorandum from Judge John F. Grady, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil 
Rules to Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & 
Procedure, at vi–vii (June 12, 1989), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV06-1989.pdf (describing the proposed 
changes to Rule 56).  
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become familiar with the language of the rule and the current case law.”6 
Another view was that “some members seemed not to like the case law on 
Rule 56 and might not have wanted to enshrine it in the rule.”7 
Rule 56 was not forgotten, but the impetus to restore it to an active 
place on the Committee agenda arose from the Style Project. The Style 
Project undertook to rewrite all of the Civil Rules to say more clearly what 
they actually meant.8 Any attempt to change the meaning of a rule had to 
be published separately, for separate comment. When Rule 56 took its 
turn, the Committee was persuaded that actual practice in administering 
summary judgment had moved far from the rule text in many ways. Any 
effort to make the rule conform to practice, and perhaps to introduce 
some new wrinkles, must be undertaken independently. 
So in 2005, Judge Rosenthal, then-Chair of the Committee, suggest-
ed that the time had come to reconsider the procedures that surround 
summary judgment.9 The scope of the project was clear from the begin-
ning. The standard for summary judgment was not to be considered. 
Lower courts had worked to develop the 1986 decisions for nearly 20 
years and were continuing to work at the task. This process should be al-
lowed to continue, working through far more concrete problems in a far 
greater variety of settings than any committee project could consider. 
The allocation of the moving burden also was not to be considered be-
cause it is so closely related to the summary-judgment standard. 
The 1992 proposal provided the foundation for the initial drafts. 
The passage of time, however, meant that substantial changes were made 
even in the initial drafts. From this starting point, the project was pur-
sued through countless subcommittee meetings,10 two “miniconfer-
ences,”11 several Committee meetings,12 consideration by the Standing 
 
6 Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Minutes Dec. 17–19, 1992, at 2, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ 
ST12-1992-min.pdf.  
7 Id.  
8 See Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1761 (2004).  
9 Memorandum from Judge Lee H. Rosenthal to the Civil Rules Comm. (Oct. 10, 
2005), at 3, 155–85, in Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil Procedure, Agenda Book 
for Oct. 27–28, 2005, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2005-10.pdf [hereinafter Agenda 
Book Oct. 27–28, 2005]. 
10 The Rule 56 Subcommittee was chaired throughout by Judge Michael M. 
Baylson. The Subcommittee met frequently by telephone and occasionally in person 
in conjunction with a miniconference or a committee meeting.  
11 Notes on the November 7, 2007 Miniconference are included in the 
Committee agenda materials for April 7–8, 2008. Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Agenda Book Apr. 7–8, 2008, at 60–81, available at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2008-04.pdf 
[hereinafter Agenda Book Apr. 7–8, 2008]. Notes on the January 28, 2007 
Miniconference are included in the Committee agenda materials for April 19–20, 
2007. Notes: Rule 56 Miniconference, at 1–19, in Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil 
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Committee,13 numerous public comments and extensive testimony,14 and 
many drafts.15 Rigorous empirical information was sought by asking the 
Federal Judicial Center to study actual uses and outcomes of summary-
judgment motions.16 The proposal published for comment in the sum-
mer of 2008 was shaped by three years of continuous work. 
The next Section begins with two important changes that were made 
in light of comments and testimony on the published draft. The word 
expressing the command to grant summary judgment was changed from 
 
Procedure, Agenda Book Apr. 19–20, 2007, available at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2007-04.pdf 
[hereinafter Agenda Book Apr. 19–20, 2007]. Miniconferences are held to discuss 
drafts of complex proposals with fifteen to twenty invited participants who are not 
directly involved with the Committee. The process provides a small-scale version of 
the public comment process that follows actual publication of a proposal. The 
different participants in these two miniconferences provided invaluable help in 
refining the proposals to become ready for the public-comment process. 
12 Rule 56 materials appear in the agenda books beginning with the October 27–
28, 2005 agenda book and continue through the April 20–21, 2009 Committee 
meeting. See Agenda Book Oct. 27–28, 2005, supra note 9; Advisory Comm. on 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes Apr. 20–21, 2009, available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-2009-min.pdf 
[hereinafter Minutes Apr. 20–21, 2009].  
13 The Civil Rules Committee, and the other advisory committees, continually 
inform the Standing Committee of active agenda items. Rule 56 was brought on for an 
initial—and lively—discussion at the meeting on January 14–15, 2008. See Comm. on 
Rules of Practice & Procedure, Agenda Book Jan. 14–15, 2008, at 164, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/ 
ST2008-01.pdf. The proposal to publish proposed Rule 56 for comment was presented 
at the meeting on June 9–10, 2008. See Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, 
Agenda Book June 9–10, 2008, at 227, available at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/2008-06-Standing-Agenda-
Book-Vol-I.pdf. The recommendation to recommend the final rule to the Judicial 
Conference was presented at the meeting on June 1–2, 2009. See Comm. on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure, Agenda Book June 1–2, 2009, at 92, 111, 194–280, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standi
ng/ST2009-06.pdf [hereinafter Agenda Book June 1–2, 2009].  
14 The written comments and transcripts of the testimony at the three hearings 
are available on the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
Summaries of the comments and transcripts are included in the agenda materials for 
the June 1–2, 2009 meeting of the Standing Committee. Agenda Book June 1–2, 
2009, supra note 13, at 210–80. 
15 The drafts began with “56.” After several changes had been made, it seemed 
prudent to begin anew with “56.1.” Several changes later, “56.2” appeared. The 
proposal transmitted by the Standing Committee to the Judicial Conference, and 
ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court, was “56.40.” (Copies on file with author.) 
16 See Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr. to Judge 
Michael Baylson, Report on Summary Judgment Practice Across Districts with 
Variations in Local Rules (Aug. 13, 2008), available at https://bulk.resource.org/ 
courts.gov/fjc/sujulrs2.pdf; Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. 
Judicial Ctr. to Judge Michael Baylson, Estimates of Summary Judgment Activity in 
Fiscal Year 2006 (June 15, 2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ 
lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf.  
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“should” to “shall,” reflecting a profound division of views on the role of 
summary judgment in relation to trial. An elaborate “point–
counterpoint” procedure designed to channel presentation of a motion 
and resistance to it was abandoned in face of mixed experience with simi-
lar procedures adopted by local rules. Both of these changes relate to a 
third question that was resolved before publication—whether the court 
must examine the materials relied upon to support the motion if there is 
no proper response. 
The brief third Section describes a few of the changes that were 
made before publication as the committee process added, discarded, and 
substituted many provisions in the search for a good rule. These changes 
are intrinsically interesting as issues in summary-judgment procedure. 
They also illustrate the painstaking care that is taken to present a pro-
posal worthy of being refined by the public-comment process without the 
distractions of many small points that require further improvements. 
II. THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC COMMENTS 
Two deep divisions of opinion emerged during the public-comment 
period. Each illustrates the vital role public comments play in the full 
Rules Enabling Act process.17 
 
17 28 U.S.C. § 2072 recognizes the Supreme Court’s “power to prescribe general 
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the” district courts 
and courts of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012). Section 331 directs the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to “carry on a continuous study of the operation and 
effect of the general rules of practice and procedure,” and to recommend to the 
Supreme Court “changes in and additions to” these rules. Id. § 331. Section 2073 
authorizes the Judicial Conference to appoint committees to assist in recommending 
rules under § 2072 (and also § 2075, which enables the Court to prescribe rules of 
bankruptcy practice). Id. §§ 2073(a), 2075. Section 2073(b) amplifies this authority by 
directing that the Judicial Conference “shall authorize the appointment of a standing 
committee on rules of practice, procedure, and evidence . . . . Such standing 
committee shall review each recommendation of any other committees so appointed” 
and make recommendations to the Judicial Conference. Id. The Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee is one of five advisory committees that make recommendations to the 
Standing Committee. Section 2073(c) directs that each meeting of any committee 
appointed under § 2073 be open to the public, and that any meeting be preceded by 
sufficient notice to enable interested persons to attend. Id. The final step comes when 
the Supreme Court transmits to Congress a rule prescribed under § 2072. Id. A rule 
transmitted “not later than May 1 of the year in which” it is to become effective takes 
effect on the following December 1 “unless otherwise provided by law.” Id. The 
provisions for public comments and public hearings are established by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States. 1 Standing Comm., Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policy § 440 (2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
Procedures_for_Rules_Cmtes.pdf. 
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A. Shall, Should, Must (or May)? 
One debate addressed the question whether a judge should have 
discretion to deny summary judgment, preferring trial, even if the sum-
mary-judgment papers seem to show there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact. This debate goes to the very nature of summary judg-
ment. 
It all began innocently. The Style Project undertook to rewrite the 
entire body of Civil Rules, aiming to achieve clearer expression without 
changing the meaning.18 From the beginning in 1938, Rule 56 directed 
that summary judgment “shall be rendered” if the papers show that 
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”19 The convention of 
the Style Project was that “shall” must not be used as a word of authority. 
It was to be replaced by “must,” or “may,” or “should.”20 The 2007 Com-
mittee Note explained that “shall” was replaced with “should” in Rule 56 
because “there is discretion to deny summary judgment when it appears 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.”21 This drafting 
choice emerged unscathed from the public comment period. From 2007 
 
18 See Cooper, supra note 8, at 1761. 
19 Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 
645, 735 (1938). 
20 See Bryan A. Garner, Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules 
29 (1996). 
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (2007). To support this 
proposition, the Note cited Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256–57 (1948), 
and 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2728 (3d ed. 1998). The Kennedy case involved 
questions under the Fair Labor Standards Act and related statutes that the Court 
described as “an extremely important question . . . ultimately affecting by a vast sum 
the cost of fighting” World War II. Kennedy, 334 U.S. at 256. The cited paragraph said 
this: “We do not hold that in the form the controversy took in the District Court that 
tribunal lacked power or justification for applying the summary judgment procedure. 
But summary procedures, however salutary where issues are clear-cut and simple, 
present a treacherous record for deciding issues of far-flung import, on which this 
Court should draw inferences with caution from complicated courses of legislation, 
contracting and practice.” Id. at 256–57 (footnote omitted). This passage, and a 
casual footnote statement that “Rule 56 provides that the trial court may award 
summary judgment,” id. at 252 n.4, can easily suggest discretion to deny summary 
judgment even when the record satisfies the standard for granting summary 
judgment. This reading is supported by the Court’s later citation of the Kennedy 
decision: “Neither do we suggest that the trial courts should act other than with 
caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary 
judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to 
proceed to a full trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) 
(citing Kennedy, 334 U.S. 249). On the other hand, the opinion could be read to 
reflect the Court’s reluctance “as a matter of good judicial administration,” to decide 
for itself “issues of far-flung import” on the basis of arguments and materials 
submitted after the summary-judgment record was closed. Kennedy, 334 U.S. at 252, 
257. 
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to 2010, Rule 56 directed that the court “should” grant summary judg-
ment. 
“Should” was retained in the version of Rule 56 published for com-
ment in August 2008.22 This time it did not escape unnoticed. Quite to 
the contrary, it provoked an outpouring of comments. Many comments, 
primarily offered by those who ordinarily represent defendants, urged 
that “shall” means “must.” Added support was found in the words “enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summary judgment was lauded as 
an essential instrument to protect against the costs of going to trial, or 
being coerced to settle. “Should,” on the other hand, was championed—
primarily by those who ordinarily represent plaintiffs—as a necessary 
safety valve to protect against the risk that summary judgment may cut off 
a claim that would win a deserved vindication at trial.23 
The Committee ultimately chose to restore “shall,” in deliberate de-
fiance of the style convention. The 2010 Committee Note explained that 
neither “must” nor “should” “is suitable in light of the case law.”24 An ex-
haustive memorandum prepared for the Committee showed that alt-
hough many courts had recognized discretion to deny summary judg-
ment despite an apparent showing that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact, other courts had seemed to deny any such discretion.25 
The Note explained further that “[e]liminating ‘shall’ created an unac-
ceptable risk of changing the summary-judgment standard. Restoring 
‘shall’ avoids the unintended consequences of any other word.”26 This 
explanation fit “shall” within two other conventions of the Style Project, 
and within the limited scope of the Rule 56 revision. One convention was 
that an ambiguity in rule text that had not been clarified by decisional 
law must be carried forward, lest resolution of the ambiguity into a clear 
direction change the rule’s meaning. A second convention forbade inter-
ference with “sacred phrases” that had taken on independent lives. Faced 
with ambiguity in a sacred phrase, there was a clear prospect that substi-
tuting a clear rule would indeed affect the standard for summary judg-
ment. 
Which side had the better of it, as a matter of Rule 56 principle? The 
Rule 56 work was not bound by the strictures that fenced substantive de-
cisions out of the Style Project. It could have opted for an unambiguous 
command, adopting “must” to entrench the advantages of summary 
 
22 The proposed amendments to Rule 56 can be found in the agenda book for 
the June 1–2, 2009 Standing Committee meeting. Agenda Book June 1–2, 2009, supra 
note 13, at 194–200.  
23 Summaries of the written comments and testimony are provided in the agenda 
book for the June 1–2, 2009 Standing Committee meeting. Agenda Book June 1–2, 
2009, supra note 13, at 210–80. 
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Note (2010). 
25 Agenda Book Apr. 7–8, 2008, supra note 11, at 86–106. 
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Note (2010). 
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judgment in avoiding costly trials. Why should there have been any reluc-
tance? 
One range of arguments for “should” is pragmatic, particularly from 
the court’s perspective. A summary-judgment motion may require a very 
difficult, on-the-edge decision whether the summary-judgment record 
shows just barely enough to escape a directed verdict at trial. It may be 
far easier for the judge—if not the parties—to hold a trial that may con-
sume less time, perhaps much less time, than deliberating the motion. 
The time spent on deliberation is wasted if the motion is denied, and 
much of it is wasted if the motion is granted only in part. The time also is 
wasted if summary judgment is granted, only to be reversed on appeal. 
Despite the costs to the parties, a careful allocation of scarce judicial re-
sources may justify discretion to deny. And the parties also benefit if an 
actual decision would deny the motion after delaying proceedings to 
make the ruling, or would grant the motion only to be reversed on ap-
peal. 
Another argument draws from the well-established rule that once 
trial is had, the sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the trial rec-
ord, not the summary-judgment record.27 A judgment on a jury verdict or 
a judge’s findings based on a sufficient trial record stands. It will not be 
reversed after trial on the ground that judgment as a matter of law would 
have been required on the summary-judgment record.28 There is no “en-
titlement” to summary judgment. If anything, the courts should join with 
the winning party in celebrating the advantage of waiting for trial. In 
turn, this practice suggests a deeper insight. A paper summary-judgment 
record may strike a judge as too incomplete, too uncertain, to justify for-
going the opportunity to learn whether a real and full trial record makes 
out a sufficient case. This concern may be particularly important when a 
case involves issues of some public importance beyond the parties’ inter-
ests, and even more important if the law is unclear and would benefit 
from considering facts as they are presented at trial. 
The value of opting for trial may be put more directly. The only way 
to know whether trial will produce a record that rises above the directed-
verdict threshold is to have a trial. Any summary judgment based on 
treating a paper record as if a trial record rests on a vulnerable assump-
tion. Summary judgment is a valuable tool despite this vulnerability, but 
it may not always rise to the level of deserved entitlement. 
Yet another argument draws from the integration of summary-
judgment standards with the standards for judgment as a matter of law 
after trial. It is clear that a court does not have discretion to enter judg-
ment on a verdict based on evidence that fails to cross the threshold for 
 
27 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 889 (2011) (“Once the case proceeds to 
trial, the full record developed in court supersedes the record existing at the time of 
the summary judgment motion.”). 
28 See 15B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d, § 3914.28 (2d ed. 1992). 
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escaping judgment as a matter of law. But Rule 50(b) and (c) recognize 
discretion to grant a new trial even though judgment cannot be entered 
on the verdict.29 Elaborate procedures have been developed to preserve 
this discretion.30 If there is discretion to allow a second full trial after a 
first full trial has failed to produce sufficient evidence to escape judg-
ment as a matter of law, why should there not be discretion to deny 
summary judgment so as to provide an opportunity for a first full trial to 
escape judgment as a matter of law? 
These reflections on some of the established practices that surround 
summary judgment pave the way for the central question. Just how much 
should we make of summary judgment? Denial may lead to trial, the cen-
tral—if seldom—feature of civil procedure. Although that may seem a 
good thing, it imposes costs. The costs may seem particularly inappropri-
ate in the face of a motion that urges an immunity defense designed to 
protect against the burdens of trial.31 Denial instead may lead to settle-
ment, commonly a compromise that seems to overvalue or undervalue 
the claims. Plausible arguments might be made that denying summary 
judgment in order to pave the way for settlement can promote a just out-
come. Some of the public comments suggested that some judges do this 
deliberately. Fervent arguments are made to decry any such practice. 
Caught in the middle of these competing forces, the Committee 
chose to adhere to the original purpose to avoid any changes that might 
affect the standard for granting summary judgment. The Committee 
Note, in expressing an intent to avoid “the unintended consequences” of 
any word other than “shall,” reflects two common themes in Committee 
work. One is exactly what the words express—a concern that a rule that 
seems attractive in the abstract may in practice develop in undesirable 
ways. The other, closely allied to it, is a belief that truly complex choices 
are often better made in a common-law process that stretches out over 
countless cases, crossing the full range of subjects brought before the 
courts. So it may be with discretion to deny summary judgment. Some 
courts continue to recognize this discretion.32 “Shall,” in its unrestrained 
ambiguity, leaves the way open for continuing development, one way or 
 
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. 
30 The need to observe Rule 50 procedures punctiliously is illustrated by Unitherm 
Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 399–402 (2006). 
31 See Jones v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir.1994), aff’d, 515 U.S. 304 
(1995), an official-immunity case that states a general proposition that there is no 
discretion—that summary judgment must be granted if the nonmovant lacks 
sufficient evidence. 
32  E.g., Fencorp, Co. v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 933, 939–41 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
A different approach is to confer with the parties before any motion is filed. Judge 
Zouhary, for example, notes that he “may encourage the parties to go straight to 
trial—bringing the case to conclusion quicker and at less cost than briefing motions.” 
Jack Zouhary, Ten Commandments for Effective Case Management, 60 Fed. Law., Jan./Feb. 
2013, at 38, 39. 
LCB_18_3_Art_3_E_Cooper_final.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/30/2014  1:14 PM 
602 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:3 
the other. Whatever the eventual outcome, the public comment process 
effectively redirected Rule 56 on a point that lies close to the heart of 
summary judgment. 
Leaving in limbo the question of discretion in disposing of an entire 
motion did not, however, carry over to the option available when “the 
court does not grant all the relief requested by the motion.”33 Rule 56(g) 
says gently that the court “may” enter an order stating any material fact 
that is not genuinely in dispute. Before the Style Project, its predecessor, 
Rule 56(d), said the court “shall if practicable” ascertain and specify “the 
facts that appear without substantial controversy.” From 2007, Style Rule 
56(d) directed that the court “should, to the extent practicable, deter-
mine what material facts are not genuinely in dispute.” The choice of 
“may” was actively discussed, both in Committee deliberations and public 
comment. “May” was seen to recognize more discretion than “should.” 
The advantages of broad discretion began with a negative—the gains 
from partial summary judgment may be less than the gains from sum-
mary judgment on the whole action. The gains, further, might be offset 
not only by the time required to make the rulings and the risk of reversal 
after further proceedings, but also by the prospect that trial of the re-
maining issues would—at perhaps negligible cost—provide a better basis 
for determining whether there is a genuine dispute.34 Here, at least, dis-
cretion is well entrenched. 
B. Point–counterpoint 
Public comments and testimony also redirected a proposal that 
aimed at the procedure for framing a summary-judgment decision. The 
published proposal included an elaborate procedure that came to be 
known as the “point–counterpoint” procedure: 
(c) Procedures. 
. . . 
(2) Motion, Statement, and Brief; Response and Brief; Reply 
and Brief. 
(A) Motion, Statement, and Brief. The movant must simulta-
neously file: 
(i) a motion that identifies each claim or defense—or 
the part of each claim or defense—on which summary 
judgment is sought; 
(ii) a separate statement that concisely identifies in 
separately numbered paragraphs only those material 
 
33 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). 
34 This summary paraphrases the question framed for the Committee in the 
materials for the April 7–8, 2008 meeting. Agenda Book Apr. 7–8, 2008, supra note 
11, at 47 n.25. 
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facts that cannot be genuinely disputed and entitle 
the movant to summary judgment; and 
(iii) a brief of its contentions on the law or facts. 
(B) Response and Brief by the Opposing Party. A party 
opposing summary judgment: 
(i) must file a response that, in correspondingly 
numbered paragraphs, accepts or disputes—or ac-
cepts in part and disputes in part—each fact in the 
movant’s statement; 
(ii) may in response concisely identify in separately 
numbered paragraphs additional material facts that 
preclude summary judgment; and 
(iii) must file a brief of its contentions on the law or 
facts. 
(C) Reply and Brief. The movant: 
(i) must file, in the form required by Rule 
56(c)(2)(B)(i), a reply to any additional facts stated 
by the nonmovant; and 
(ii) may file a reply brief.35 
This detailed road map was drawn both from the proposal that failed 
in the Judicial Conference in 1992 and from experience with similar pro-
cedures specified by the local rules in many districts. It is difficult to im-
agine an orderly procedure that does not require identification of the 
material facts claimed to be established beyond genuine dispute, and also 
require citations to the record materials that establish whether there is a 
genuine dispute as to each of those facts. So too for the “additional mate-
rial facts” that may preclude summary judgment even though there is a 
genuine dispute as to those facts. Many comments supported the pro-
posal in essentially these terms, complaining that without such directions, 
motions and responses often were like ships passing in the night. The ad-
vantages of a uniform national procedure were also urged in support. 
This proposal might have survived as an example of adopting into na-
tional procedure a procedure that had been tested through local rules in 
many districts. 
Disagreement, however, drew from actual experience with the local 
rules to offer three main lines of argument for rejecting point–
counterpoint. One was that some lawyers had responded by generating 
fantastically lengthy motions, listing hundreds of facts said to be without 
genuine dispute. The cost of responding fact-by-fact was great. The alter-
native of simply failing to contest facts that seemed not material was used 
only with reluctance, in part for fear that the court might think the fact 
material and in part for fear that failure to contest on summary judgment 
would somehow limit the opportunity to contest at trial. 
 
35 Agenda Book June 1–2, 2009, supra note 13, at 133–35. 
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A second concern was that point–counterpoint procedures are inim-
ical to the nonmovant’s ability to present its case cogently. These com-
ments focused on motions made by a party who does not have the bur-
den at trial, usually the defendant. The movant gets to shape the case by 
its choice and ordering of facts. The obligation to respond in the same 
sequence to a fractured statement of facts, moreover, makes it difficult to 
reassemble the facts in a pattern that supports the inferences that are 
necessary to support many claims. Employment discrimination claims 
were a particularly common illustration. An employee with an exemplary 
work record complains of discrimination against another worker. Two 
days later, she is discharged for clocking in 10 minutes late. An inference 
of pretext, of intent to discriminate, may depend on a concerted presen-
tation of the treatment of other employees who have clocked in late. To 
these lawyers, the nonmovant, who has the burden at trial, should be al-
lowed to tell a coherent story that weaves the facts into a pattern far dif-
ferent from the order chosen by the movant. 
A third concern was that a summary-judgment motion by a party who 
does not have the trial burden reverses the ordinary sequence that, at tri-
al, allows the party who has the burden to open and close. The three-step 
procedure embodied in the proposal would mean that the movant gets to 
open, and, in its reply, to have the last word. One suggested remedy was 
to provide for a surreply. The need to provide for a surreply was further 
supported by several witnesses who said that some motions deliberately 
presented a fuzzy and incomplete initial statement of facts, to be followed 
by a clearly focused reply that left the nonmovant without any clear op-
portunity to challenge the facts asserted in the reply. 
These concerns seemed real. They were supported by the particular-
ly powerful testimony and comments of several federal district judges. 
Some were judges who had extensive experience both in their own dis-
trict, without a point–counterpoint practice, and in another district 
where, as visiting judges, they confronted a point–counterpoint practice. 
They testified that the point–counterpoint practice took longer, cost 
more, and produced less satisfactory results. Many more were judges 
from districts that had once adopted local rules directing a point–
counterpoint procedure, and then abandoned the procedure for the rea-
sons given by the lawyers who opposed the proposal.36 
The opposition stood in marked contrast with the enthusiasm of 
other judges for the point–counterpoint procedures established by their 
local rules. The conclusion seemed plain enough. Point–counterpoint 
was not ready for adoption as a uniform national rule. At the same time, 
nothing should be done to preempt local rules adopting this procedure. 
 
36 See Agenda Book June 1–2, 2009, supra note 13, at 237–38, 243, 245. Judge 
Vaughn R. Walker, a Committee member, provided a foretaste of the judges’ 
comments in a memorandum to Judge Michael M. Baylson. Agenda Book Apr. 19–
20, 2007, supra note 11, Memorandum from Judge Vaughn R. Walker to Judge 
Michael M. Baylson, Comments on Summary Judgment Proposal (Mar. 7, 2007), at 1–4.  
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This may well be an example of a procedure that works in some courts 
but not others. Apart from possible differences in case mix and docket 
pressures, the culture of the local bar may be important. Ingrained tradi-
tions and reflexes may lead too many lawyers in some districts to the 
kinds of practices that led to abandonment of what proved to be experi-
ments in point–counterpoint. Sturdy common sense and an understand-
ing of the need for proportion may be more widely shared in other dis-
tricts, enabling a procedure that, wisely employed, could substantially 
promote efficient presentation and proper disposition. 
C. Summary Judgment by Default? 
Recognizing a role for local rules led to a question that was resolved 
in Committee deliberations before publication. Point–counterpoint local 
rules commonly include a provision that a fact is “deemed admitted” if 
there is no response or if an attempted response does not conform to the 
detailed point–counterpoint procedure. This approach touches on a 
deeper question—can summary judgment be granted by “default?” A 
pure default approach would grant the motion if there is no response, 
and perhaps also if there is a defective response, without any further con-
sideration.37 A pure rejection of default would require the court to exam-
ine the materials submitted with the motion to determine whether, 
standing alone, they suffice to carry the burden of showing no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact.38 More than one intermediate position is 
possible. Some were considered. One would require examination of the 
supporting materials, not to determine whether they carry the summary-
judgment burden, but only to determine whether they support the mo-
vant’s position. For example, a plaintiff’s affidavit that the defendant 
went through a red light need not be believed, and does not carry the 
 
37 Summary judgment by default might be supported by analogy to Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure Rule 55, which authorizes default and then judgment by default 
for failing to plead or otherwise defend. Some analogy also might be found in Rule 
37(b)(2)(A)(vi), which authorizes a default judgment as a sanction for failing to obey 
a discovery order. A party who fails to play by the rules may properly be subject to 
severe sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), 55(a). 
38 This approach is reflected in interim drafts. An example is a draft Rule 56(d): 
“If a party does not respond to the motion or if a response fails to comply with Rule 
56(c) [point–counterpoint provisions], the court may . . . . (2) grant summary 
judgment if the motion and supporting materials show that the movant is entitled to 
it . . . .” Memorandum from Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. 
Rules of Civil Procedure to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 57, 61 (May 25, 
2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
Reports/CV05-2007.pdf. Several decisions seemed to require this examination of the 
summary-judgment record. See De la Vega v. San Juan Star, Inc., 377 F.3d 111, 115–16 
(1st Cir. 2004); Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 242 (2d Cir. 
2004); United States v. 5800 SW 74th Ave., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101–02 (11th Cir. 2004). 
See also Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 950 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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plaintiff’s summary-judgment burden on this issue, but does support the 
position.39 
These questions require careful evaluation of the value that should 
be placed on summary judgment as a means of final disposition without 
trial. They were resolved in Rule 56(e), which permits—but does not re-
quire—a court to “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the mo-
tion” if a party fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact. 
Considering the fact undisputed does not of itself lead to summary 
judgment. The court may grant summary judgment only “if the motion 
and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—
show that the movant is entitled to it.” “Deemed admitted” practice un-
der local rules is preserved. But the court still must determine whether 
the movant has carried the burden as to any material facts challenged by 
a proper response, and must determine the legal effects of the package 
of facts considered undisputed and those, if any, shown to be without 
genuine dispute despite a properly framed response. 
Rule 56(e) lives in the space between discretion to deny summary 
judgment and point–counterpoint procedure. A court has discretion 
whether to consider a fact undisputed when it is not properly addressed 
by a response. The Committee Note suggests that in many circumstances, 
the preferred first step may be to invoke Rule 56(e)(1), giving a further 
opportunity to address the fact properly. 
D. Accept Fact for Motion Only 
A less fundamental procedure also was linked to the point–
counterpoint proposal. The concern that a motion might pile on a large 
number of facts not material to the decision led to subdivision (c)(3) in 
the published proposal: “A party may accept or dispute a fact either gen-
erally or for purposes of the motion only.”40 A nonmovant could avoid 
the risk of admitting, or the work of refuting, by provisionally accepting 
an asserted fact. But fears were expressed that the acceptance might be 
misused as a stipulation.41 A more general concern was that accepting a 
fact for purposes of the motion might lead the court to treat the fact as 
established in the case even on denying summary judgment. In the end, 
the Committee decided to delete this provision as part of the decision to 
discard the point–counterpoint provision.42 But the Committee Note to 
Rule 56(g) directs that the court must take care not to treat a fact as es-
 
39 This possibility is described in the Rule 56 Subcommittee notes of February 13, 
2008 conference call, see Agenda Book Apr. 7–8, 2008, supra note 11, at 59, and again 
in the March 3, 2008 Draft Rule 56 with Discussion Notes. Id. at 45 n.20. 
40 Agenda Book June 1–2, 2009, supra note 13, at 135. 
41 Hearing on Evidence Before the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 104–05 (Feb. 2, 
2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV02-
2009-tr.pdf [hereinafter Hearing on Evidence] (statement of Sharon J. Arkin, The 
Arkin Law Firm). 
42 Minutes Apr. 20–21, 2009, supra note 12, at 7. 
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tablished because a party has accepted it for purposes of the motion only. 
And Rule 56(c)(1)(A) recognizes that the parties may enter a stipulation 
made for purposes of the motion only, a bilateral act that ensures better 
protection than a unilateral “acceptance.” 
III. ISSUES RESOLVED BEFORE PUBLICATION 
Changes made in response to public comments and testimony are 
the most visible signs of progress through deliberation. Publication is 
recommended, however, only after thorough, and often repeated, testing 
by internal deliberations. When there is a subcommittee, Committee de-
liberations begin with recommendations or choices developed by the 
subcommittee but carry on independently and in depth. A few examples 
from the Rule 56 work illustrate these events. 
A. Materials Not Cited 
The court’s opportunity to examine materials not cited by the parties 
lies at the intersection of point–counterpoint procedure and the court’s 
authority to act on its own. Rule 56(f) reflects several practices that had 
emerged in practice without any foundation in prior rule text. The court 
may grant summary judgment for a nonmovant, grant a motion on 
grounds not raised by a party, and consider summary judgment on its 
own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be in 
genuine dispute. But it must first give notice and a reasonable opportuni-
ty to respond. Are there other things that it may, or even must, do? The 
Committee began with the premise expressed in an oft-quoted phrase 
that “[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in” the case 
file.43 That premise is reflected in the first part of Rule 56(c)(3): “The 
court need consider only the cited materials . . . .” But if not obliged to 
take up the hunt, may a judge still examine the file for materials that may 
illuminate those cited by the parties? A distinction might be drawn be-
tween searching out materials that defeat a motion by showing a genuine 
dispute and searching out materials that support the motion by showing 
a lack of genuine dispute not shown by the parties. There is a risk that 
the court may misinterpret materials the parties had good reason to pass 
over, and the risk seems more severe if summary judgment is granted. 
This distinction was observed in the published proposal by requiring no-
tice under Rule 56(f) before granting summary judgment on record ma-
terials not cited by the parties. But in the end, the Committee concluded 
that the court should not be required to give notice. An example was that 
the court should be free to read the entire transcript of a deposition on 
 
43 This phrase appears to have originated in United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 
956 (7th Cir. 1991), where it denied an obligation to hunt for facts buried in briefs. It 
soon came to be adopted for summary judgment. See, e.g., Crossley v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 
355 F.3d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Dunkel, 927 F.2d at 956). 
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file, “and to evaluate the parts cited in light of the whole.”44 So Rule 
56(c)(3) provides simply that the court “may consider other materials in 
the record.” 
B. Burdens 
Early drafts included attempts to identify the burdens in making and 
opposing a motion for summary judgment. The first draft is set out in the 
Appendix. One of the most interesting decisions was to omit any direct 
attempt to express the burdens on movant and nonmovant. This decision 
flowed from the determination to avoid any attempt to reconsider the 
standard for granting summary judgment. The burdens may affect appli-
cation of the standard in ways that might effectively change the standard. 
The appendix includes the provision on burdens that was part of the 
proposed rule that failed in the Judicial Conference in 1992. The more 
recent draft addressed only the moving burden, distinguishing between a 
movant who has the trial burden and a movant who seeks to show that a 
nonmovant who has the trial burden cannot carry the burden. The dis-
tinction was intended to track the distinctions drawn most clearly in Jus-
tice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in the Celotex case.45 But even that 
seemed too risky. 
What emerged in place of a direct identification of the moving bur-
den is the tightly drafted subdivision (c)(1): 
(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot 
be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: 
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, includ-
ing depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made 
for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory an-
swers, or other materials; or 
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the ab-
sence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse par-
ty cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.46 
It is easy enough to track the provisions that apply to a movant who 
has the trial burden. The motion must support the assertion by citing to 
record materials, but may reply to materials cited in response by saying 
simply that they do not establish the presence of a genuine dispute. It is 
not much more difficult to track the provisions that apply to a non-
 
44 Minutes Apr. 20–21, 2009, supra note 12, at 7–8. Although a change was made 
from the published proposal, it fairly counts as the result of internal Committee 
deliberations. The only comment summarized for the Committee was that notice 
should be given whether the court grants or denies the motion on the basis of 
materials not cited by the parties. See Hearing on Evidence, supra note 41, at 238 
(statement of Jeffrey J. Greenbaum, ABA Section of Litigation). 
45 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 329–34 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
46 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
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movant who does not have the trial burden. The response can cite to 
record materials that establish a genuine dispute, or can simply show that 
the materials cited by the movant do not establish the absence of a genu-
ine dispute. A nonmovant who does have the trial burden also can cite to 
materials in the record that establish a genuine dispute. Somewhat great-
er care may be required to tease out the rule that a movant who does not 
have the trial burden can carry the burden by “showing . . . that an ad-
verse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”47 
“Showing” was deliberately adopted as one of the words used by the 
Court in the Celotex opinion.48 There is no attempt to solve the mystery of 
how a movant who does not have the trial burden goes about showing 
that the nonmovant does not have enough evidence to carry the trial 
burden. The Committee Note explains blandly that “[t]he amendments 
will not affect continuing development of the decisional law construing” 
the standard that there be no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.49 It is safe to 
assume that continuing development will not reduce the movant’s bur-
den so as to allow a motion that says only that the movant is entitled to 
summary judgment unless the nonmovant comes forward with materials 
showing that it can carry the trial burden of production. Rule 
56(c)(1)(B) does require the movant to show that the nonmovant cannot 
produce admissible evidence to support the fact. 
C. Standard 
The initial decision to avoid any consideration of the summary-
judgment standard was observed without question throughout the pro-
ject. This decision rested in large part on deference to the Supreme 
Court’s opinions and to faith in the capacity of many courts, working in 
parallel, to continue to develop a working standard sturdier, and better 
nuanced, than a Committee might articulate in a few words. But it also 
reflected the inescapable constraints that limit the opportunity to revise 
the standard, which are anchored in directed-verdict practice.50 Rule 50 
was amended in 1991 to substitute “judgment as a matter of law” for the 
older (and better descriptive) phrases, directed verdict and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. The Committee Note explains that “judg-
ment as a matter of law” was familiar from Rule 56, and “its use in Rule 
50 calls attention to the relationship between the two rules.”51 At least in a 
 
47 Id. 
48 When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, “the burden on the 
moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district 
court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. 
49 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B), and Advisory Committee Note (2010).  
50 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
250 (1986)).  
51 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Note (1991). 
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case subject to the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, it is nearly im-
possible to suggest that summary judgment could cut off the right to jury 
trial even though the jury would have the right to decide if the same evi-
dence were presented at trial. The efficiency advantages of avoiding jury 
trial cannot be counted as justification. Nor is there much reason to allow 
freer use of summary judgment in cases that are not to be tried to a jury, 
either because there is no right to a jury trial or because no party has 
demanded a jury trial. It is better to retain the familiar term52 than to at-
tempt to express the standard in new words, inviting at least confusion 
and perhaps distorting ongoing evolution of the standard. Of course, it 
would be possible to set the threshold for summary judgment higher, 
denying summary judgment unless the evidence falls to some interval be-
low the standard for judgment as a matter of law. That would go further 
than simple discretion to deny summary judgment when the evidence 
fails to satisfy the standard, a discretion that even now remains so far con-
troversial as to cause restoration of “shall” in Rule 56(a). 
POSTSCRIPT 
This Essay is a selective short story of the process that developed the 
Rule 56 amendments that were adopted by the Supreme Court and took 
effect in 2010. The full story is told in public Committee papers equal in 
length to a multi-volume novel, and—to procedure addicts—equally fas-
cinating. The amendments are, above all, a Committee product. The role 
of the Committee Chair, here Judge Rosenthal at the inception and then 
Judge Kravitz in the execution, is to inspire the Committee to rise to the 
highest level of excellence it can attain. Judge Kravitz filled that role in 
superlative fashion. The success owes much to his intellect, experience, 
skills as lawyer and judge, and qualities as leader. In addition, the success 
was fostered by his ability to make friends of all those who worked with 
him. Universal good feelings made for good work. The same must be said 
 
52 The familiar term was so well entrenched that it seemed impervious to the 
perplexing variations that appeared in Rule 56(d) before the Style Project. Rather 
than ask whether there is a “genuine issue,” Rule 56(d) directed that if decision of a 
summary-judgment motion did not cover the whole case or all the relief requested, 
the court “shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy.” Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts, 308 U.S. 645, 735 
(1938). Either these phrases suggested a different standard for “partial summary 
judgment,” or they expressed possible tests for finding a genuine issue. “[S]ubstantial 
controversy” might suggest that it is not enough to barely meet the directed-verdict 
standard. “[I]n good faith controverted” might suggest that there is a genuine issue if 
a party in good faith believes there is enough evidence to meet the directed-verdict 
standard, even when there is not. These irregularities were deleted in the Style 
Project. The Committee Note says that Style Rule 56 “adopts terms directly parallel 
to” the “genuine issue” test, replacing this “variety of different phrases.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56 advisory committee’s note (2007). 
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for all the other projects completed or begun during his term as Chair, 
carried on while he chaired the Standing Committee, and carrying on 
still. He completely embodied the full range of attributes that mark the 
successive committee chairs I have worked with, going back to 1991. He 
lives on in many ways, including in the Civil Rules that he helped to 
shape. 
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APPENDIX: DRAFT BURDEN PROVISION53 
Alternatives 
An Attempt to Identify the Moving Burden54 
(d) Moving Burden. A motion for summary judgment must show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
(1) Movant Has Trial Burden. A movant who has the trial bur-
den [of persuasion]55 must show affirmatively that it is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
53 This sketch was provided as an “alternative” at the end of draft 56.1 (on file 
with the author). 
54 (This note is part of the draft 56.1 sketch cited in the preceding note.) The 
Committee has considered the question whether Rule 56 should attempt to capture 
the summary-judgment standards identified in Celotex and the other 1986 Supreme 
Court decisions. The determination so far has been to avoid the effort. The concerns 
have been that the standard is elusive and may still be evolving in practice. It would 
be difficult to find words that clearly express the intended meaning of the 1986 
decisions. Even a successful effort might ignore acquired real meaning, and might 
stifle desirable developments yet to come. An added concern has been that the Rule 
56 amendments that were rejected by the Judicial Conference in 1992 apparently 
failed because of disagreements about the attempt to restate the standard. 
The “1992” proposal was this: 
(b) Facts Not Genuinely in Dispute. A fact is not genuinely in dispute if it is 
stipulated or admitted by the parties who may be adversely affected thereby or 
if, on the basis of the evidence shown to be available for use at a trial, or the 
demonstrated lack thereof, and the burden of production or persuasion and 
standards applicable thereto, a party would be entitled at trial to a favorable 
judgment or determination with respect thereto as a matter of law under Rule 
50. 
Read carefully, the draft reflects the difference between the Rule 56 burden imposed 
on a movant who does not have the trial burden on an issue and the Rule 56 burden 
imposed on a movant who does have the trial burden. It also reflects the differences 
in the Rule 56 burden that flow from different trial standards of persuasion—a clear-
and-convincing-evidence trial standard plays out differently than a preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard. But it may be wondered whether this tight drafting would be 
as helpful as could be. It might cause more frequent recourse to case law for 
explanation than we experience now. 
Despite these concerns, there may be reasons to consider this question further. Many 
lawyers appear to believe that the actual standards for summary judgment vary among 
different courts, no matter that all recite similar formulas. If indeed standards vary in 
fact, it would be good to establish national uniformity. Whether that can be 
accomplished by rule language, no matter how carefully drawn, would be the central 
question. 
Another reason for attempting to capture the standard in rule text is that although 
courts understand the standard, many lawyers do not. If a clear statement is possible, 
real benefits could follow. 
55 There are several choices here: has “the trial burden,” “the [initial] trial 
burden of production,” “the trial burden of persuasion,” or “the trial burdens of 
production and persuasion.” The difficulty with any of these formulas is that the 
burden of production may shift, and may not always couple with the burden of 
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(2) Movant Does Not Have Trial Burden. A movant who does not 
have the trial burden [of persuasion] must: 
(A) show affirmatively that it is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, or 
(B) show that the nonmovant does not have sufficient evi-
dence to carry its burden at trial. 
 
persuasion. Particular confusion may be encountered with “prima facie case” 
concepts that call for articulated explanation. Conceptually, the best answer may be 
to refer to the burden of persuasion. The burden of persuasion is relevant when all 
the evidence is in. At that point the burden of “production” is simply a short-hand 
description of the directed-verdict standard—it expresses one of three conclusions: 
the party with the burden of persuasion has not produced sufficient evidence to 
permit a jury to be persuaded; has produced sufficient evidence to permit persuasion; 
or has produced so much evidence that the jury must be persuaded because the 
opposing party has not carried the burden of producing evidence that makes a case 
for jury decision. Ultimately, that is what the summary-judgment standard attempts to 
predict. 
